市场机制和政府调控下产学研联盟稳定性研究

为了促进产学研联盟的稳定发展,针对我国产学研联盟短期化行为严重问题,基于演化博弈理论从市场机制和政府调控两方面构建企业和学研机构联盟行为选择的决策模型,以及通过复制动态方程对策略选择进行稳定性分析,同时运用Matlab 7.0软件模拟仿真在不同程度的市场机制和政府调控下企业和学研机构在联盟创新中的演化行为。通过市场机制和政府调控两方面的深入剖析,对我国产学研联盟的稳定发展具有重要的理论指导意义。     

The analysis of popular collective action

Most models of popular collective action treat it as the behavior of single social units having unitary dispositions that explain the behavior. Since in fact it consists largely of strategic interaction among several parties, activates and builds on existing social networks, and follows a dynamic that no single-actor model can represent, available models are inadequate. Through sustained discussion of the rural conflicts of 1830 in England, this paper illustrates the critique, sketches an alternative approach centering on the analysis of repertoires of contention, and describes techniques for standardizing narratives of contention that are compatible with the alternative approach.     

The estimation of stochastic cost-quantity frontiers for discretionary cost and budgeted-expenditure systems

Two alternative approximating functions for representing the unknown composite residual density function of a cost-quantity frontier are examined. The frontier is one in which cost is regarded as preselected. This is appropriate for public sector economics and discretionary cost situations. One function requires the estimation of a single distribution parameter, whereas the other makes no a priori assumption on the shape of the density function.     

TOBIT模型在医疗费用研究中的应用

对一般人群进行医疗费用调查研究时,会存在有相当一部分人的医疗费用支出为零,以此作为因变量使用经典的线性回归进行统计建模时将会导致估计值的偏差。本文尝试使用Tobit模型及其半参数估计方法解决因变量存在大量零删失数据的问题,通过对太原市城镇居民医疗费用相关影响因素调查数据的实证分析,用以为医疗费用控制和医疗保险制度改革提供更有效的统计学方法支持和政策依据。     

Opportunistic timing and manipulation in Australian Federal Elections

In many parliamentary systems, election timing is an important decision made by governments in order to maximize their expected remaining life in power. Governments can also introduce policy or economic actions to enhance their popular standing and thus their chance of being re-elected. On the other hand, an oppositions’ natural objective is to gain power, and they will also apply controls through their own policies to reduce the governments’ chance of being re-elected. In this paper we employ a dynamic programming approach to determine the optimal timing for governments and oppositions to best utilize their limited resources. At each decision branch, the optimal control is interpreted as a Nash–Cournot equilibrium of a zero-sum political game which, in certain states, admits mixed strategy solutions. We perform a case study on the Australian Federal Election for House of Representatives.     

A flexible multicriteria decision-making methodology to support the strategic management of Science,Technology and Innovation research funding programs

Research funding programs are a policy instrument utilized by governments to influence the innovation process. They are usually elaborated, launched and managed by research funding agencies. In order to select the most adequate research projects, agencies often rely on the peer review process.This paper introduces a methodology to support funding decisions based on the peer review process. The methodology involves the use of a multicriteria decision model to support the assessment, evaluation, prioritization and selection of applications, under a multi-step decision-making process, which fits into a strategic management cycle within the agency. The Multiattribute Value Theory, being considered under a Value Focused Thinking approach, provides a basis for the construction of the multicriteria decision model. The good practices in peer review and also a logical framework for program management are considered by the methodology.A pilot study, presented in the paper, involved a retrospective implementation of a peer review process in the context of a program launched by the Ministry for Science, Technology, Innovations and Communications and the National Council of Technological and Scientific Development, in Brazil. The methodology allowed a clear distinction of roles. The agency staff in the role of decision-makers was responsible for making value judgments on behalf of the agency. The experts, in the role of committee members and ad hoc reviewers, contributed with their expertise by providing objective assessments. Such assessments served as a basis for evaluating the applications, characterizing the possible portfolios, and can be considered as data in future program evaluation studies.     

社会分配的和谐结构

实现和谐社会需要一个与之相适应的社会分配结构.借助基尼系数描述了一种和谐的社会分配结构.通过观察和分析我国近年的经济数据可以发现,为实现和谐的分配状态,我们必须应对许多严峻挑战:城乡差别依旧过大;接近占总人口20%的最贫困人群几乎没有财富积累;过大的地下经济扭曲并影响了社会的公平分配.进行社会分配必须兼顾均衡与效率.要实现和谐的分配状态,可以有许多考虑和选择.建议采取法律、法规、科技、政策和行政的各种手段,要坚决消灭近20%最贫困人群的入不敷出的情形;要全力打造中等收入阶层;要加大取缔黑色收入规范灰色收入的力度;要加快城镇化建设的步伐;要积极营建促进全民创业的环境.     

我国医疗费用增长与医疗设备投入的相关性研究

近年来我国卫生总费用占GDP的比例增长很快,而在卫生费用结构上则发生政府投入下降和个人支出的上升。本文采集了大量的统计数据,采用统计相关性研究的方法,论证了医疗设备规模的不断扩大是导致医疗费用上升的主要因素之一;医疗设备的快速增长与医院维修费用投入的增长直接相关,而引起医疗设备维修大量投入的主要原因则是故障期内医疗设备的非正常闲置。本文通过对个人卫生费用的上升、医疗设备规模的扩大及其医疗设备维修投入费用增加相关性的分析,说明了在这种关系下,十分有必要研究医院医疗设备维修体系,以在卫生投入和患者权益上达到平衡。     

基于重复博弈的地方政府精准扶贫合作机制研究

精准扶贫是习近平总书记为彻底解决贫困问题而提出一项战略要求。精准扶贫是一项复杂性较高、涉及范畴较广的系统工作,其工作的展开需要由地方政府共同协作完成。地方政府合作周期长短对精准扶贫有着巨大的影响,基于博弈论的基本思想方法,针对地方政府精准扶贫合作机制进行研究。首先,针对精准扶贫过程中完全信息静态博弈的情况,构建地方政府合作与非合作的无限次重复博弈模型,并分析双方政府均采取冷酷战略时,彼此合作的临界贴现因子;然后,针对精准扶贫过程中地方政府合作周期长短对精准扶贫成效的问题,探讨了有限重复博弈模型的临界贴现因子与地方政府合作周期的关系。分析表明:在精准扶贫过程中,双方政府合作周期越长,临界贴现因子越小,精准扶贫合作的稳定性越强。最后,针对精准扶贫过程中地方政府合作周期和合作机制等提出对策和建议。     

军民融合背景下地方政府支持与民企参军行为的演化博弈研究

民参军是军民融合的重要组成内容,政府支持对于民参军的顺利进行发挥着关键作用。本文通过建立军民融合背景下的地方政府支持与民企参军行为的演化博弈模型,考察了参与者的决策演化过程,分析了参与者的进化稳定策略及影响因素。研究表明,增加地方政府对民企的资金奖励、加大民企参军税收优惠、民企资金收益率的提升,以及积极参军成本的降低,会使民企策略选择向积极参军方向演化,但却使地方政府行为向弱力度支持策略演化;而提升中央政府对地方政府的资金补助,降低地方政府支持民企积极参军的服务成本,不仅促使民企选择积极参军策略,还能促使地方政府选择强力度支持策略。最后,对模型结果进行算例分析,验证了结论的合理性。研究结果可以为当前民参军实践提供一定的理论指导。